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the 1980s provided  generously  for military  expansion  at the 
expense of pressing  social needs.  In the wake of such 
dramatic  upheavals,  the federal government  will eventually 
be compelled  to seek out new sources of revenue  in order to 
compensate  for the decade of neglect.  But where will the 
resources  be found to close the deficit,  fully fund 
education,  support the sick and impoverished,  rebuild the 
infrastructure,  and cleanup the environment?  The Economic 
Policy Institute has placed a price tag of $65 billion  on 
these necessities.  As policy makers  survey the revenue 
alternatives  - military  cuts, a more progressive  income tax, 
a corporate  take-over  tax - one area they should not 
overlook  is the corporate profit tax. 
Most people were aware that the corporate  profit  tax 
provided  relatively  little revenue  in support of federal 
expenditures  during the 1980s.  But perhaps  less well-known 
is the fact that corporations  have enjoyed a steady decrease 
in their tax share for the past three decades.  In 1960 
corporate  profit  taxes financed approximately  22% of all 
expenditures  by the federal government  compared  to only 7% 
in 1986.  By exploring  the reasons  for this decline  it 
becomes  possible  to appreciate  the magnitude  of the 2 
potential  revenue that could be generated  from corporate  tax 
reform. 
Section  I: Declinins  Corporate Tax Share 
The share of federal expenditures  financed by 
corporate  profit taxes are shown in Figure  1 for the period 
1960 to 1986.  The share rose slightly during economic 
expansions  but plummeted  during the recessions  of 1970; 
1975, 1980, and 1982.  Although  the conservative  policies  of 
the government  in the 1980s succeeded  in keeping  corporate 
taxes relatively  low, this was only part of a thirty year 
decline. 
[See Figure  1 in the Appendix] 
The reasons  for this decline can be traced to changes 
in three  factors: taxable profits,  effective  tax rates, and 
corporate  tax credits.1  Each of these factors has its own 
unique history  as determined  by federal tax policies  and 
overall economic  conditions.  Most of the data used to 
analyze these factors were obtained  from the annual report, 
llCorporate  Income Tax Returns",  published  by the Internal 
Revenue  Service.  This primary  source was supplemented  with 
additional  data from the Economic Report  of the President, 
The Survey of Current  Business, and The National  Income and 
1 This can be summarized  by the definition  that 
T/G=(II/G)  t-(C/G) where T=taxes,  G=government  spending, 
II=profits,  t=effective  tax rate, and C=credits. Product Accounts  of the United  States,  1929-1982.  The 
following discussion  summarizes  the results of the analysis 
which are described  in more detail  in the Appendix. 
Effective  Tax Rate 
The effective  tax rate, graphed  in Figure  2, is 
essentially  an average that incorporates  the maximum 
statutory  rate, the reduced tax rate for low income  \ 
businesses,  the capital gains rate, and other exceptions. 
It is found by dividing  corporate  income tax before  credits 
by corporate  income subject to tax.  Most of the variation 
in this measure  can be attributed  to changes  in the maximum 
statutory  rate which was cut in 1965  (50% to 48%), 1979 
(46%), 1987  (40%), and again in 1988  (34%).2  The only 
significant  increases were temporary  surcharges  that raised 
the maximum  to 52.8% in 1968 and 1969, and to 49.2% in 1970. 
But overall,  the effective  tax rate fell from 46.4%  in 1960 
to 40.2% in 1986.  At least part of the explanation  for the 
declining  corporate  tax share can be attributed  to 
successive  cuts in the effective  tax rate. 
[See Figure 2 in the Appendix] 
Tax Credits 
The amount of tax actually paid by corporations  is 
found by multiplying  corporate profits by the effective  tax 
2 The statutory  rates were  found in Ando et. al.  (1985, 
p.55),  IRS, "Corporation  Income Tax Returns",  and Rosenbaum 
(1990). 4 
rate and then subtracting  the value of corporate  tax 
credits.  The two largest credits throughout  this period 
were  for foreign taxes and investment.3  Taxes paid to a 
foreign country can be counted as a credit when those 
profits  are repatriated  back to the U.S.  This provides 
incentive  for overseas  investment since tax payments  to 
states are counted merely  as deductions  rather than 
credits.4  There  is an additional  benefit  from this law 
since income from foreign subsidiaries  that is not 
repatriated  is not subject to tax. 
Since Jan.  1, 1962 another major credit has been 
an 
offered  for productive  investment,  ranging as high as 10% of 
a business'  annual  investment expenditures.  With this 
credit, the U.S. government  essentially  paid  for a fraction 
of the investments  but allowed corporations  to depreciate 
the entire amount.5  This benefits  corporations  because  they 
have to raise less capital to finance investments,  thus 
reducing  their annual capital costs.  In addition,  they can 
depreciate  assets  in excess of their actual outlay, which 
overstates  their depreciation,  understates  their profits, 
and reduces their overall tax burden.  Many of the major  tax 
changes have amended this credit  including the Tax Reform 
3 The investment  tax credit was temporarily  suspended  from 
Oct. 10, 1966 to March  9, 1967 and from April  19, 1969 to 
August  15, 1971. See Pechman  (1977 p. 151). 
4 See Anderson  (1989). 
5  The original  1962 law restricted  businesses  from 
depreciating  the government  financed component  of assets but 
this was rescinded  in the 1964 act.  See Pechman  (1977, 
148). 5 
Act of 1986 which abolished  it.  Other,  lesser credits 
offered  at various  times  include the U.S. possessions  tax 
credit, nonconventional  source fuel credit,  research 
activities  credit, and work  incentive credit. 
The relative  importance of the tax credit can be 
evaluated  by dividing  the total corporate  credit by 
government  expenditures  which  is graphed  in Figure  3.  The 
most striking  feature about this figure is the plateaux 
recorded during the period  from 1974 to 1981.  The reason 
for the elevated  levels in the 1970s can be almost entirely 
attributed  to the "oil crisis" which generated  record 
breaking  domestic  and foreign profits  for U.S. oil 
companies.  As a result, oil companies paid more profit 
taxes abroad matched  by generous  foreign tax credits  at 
home.  For example,  in 1979, the time of the second  lVoil 
crisis",  oil extracting  and refining accounted  for 68% of 
the foreign tax credit compared to only 35% in 1986.  As oil 
prices  and profits  declined  during the 198Os, so did the 
relative  importance  of tax credits although  they never  fell 
as low as the pre-oil  crisis level.  The Economic  Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 succeeded  in maintaining  credits  at 
relatively  high levels but could not match the huge credits 
generated  by the oil crisis. 
[See Figure  3 in the Appendix] 6 
Relative  Profits 
The third  factor that determines  corporate  taxes are 
profits.  These are graphed  in Figure 4, again relative  to 
total  federal government  expenditures.  The low points 
correspond  to the recessions  of 1970, 1975, and 1982.  There 
is also a significant  dropoff  in the relative  size of 
profits  after 1979.  The recessions  of 1980 and 1982 brought 
profits  down to record levels from which they apparently 
\ 
never  fully recovered.  Lower profits  as measured  by taxable 
corporate  income, is one of the major reasons  for the 
declining  corporate  tax share, especially  after  1979.  One 
could draw a hasty conclusion  from this evidence  that 
corporations  are paying  less because they are making  less 
but this fails to recognize the important distinction 
between  reported  and actual profits.  In order to explain 
this difference  it is necessary  to investigate  the methods 
used to calculate  corporate profits. 
[See Figure  4 ii1  the  Appendix] 
Section  II: Measuring  Profits 
Profits are essentially  calculated  by adding up costs 
and subtracting  them from total revenue.  One of these costs 
is a deduction  for capital consumed during the period  of 
operation.  While there  is admittedly  no easy way to 
accurately  estimate the appropriate  amount of depreciation, 
the IRS had essentially  abandoned the effort by 1962. 7 
Beginning  in 1954, more  liberal depreciation  methods  were 
adopted  followed by arbitrary  reductions  in the estimated 
useful  service lives of most capital goods  in 1962. 
Depreciation  methods were again lVliberalizedtV  in 1965 and 
1971, followed by sweeping revisions  contained  in the 
Economic Recovery  Tax Act of 1981.  The combination  of these 
changes  allowed corporations  to write off capital  costs 
considerably  faster than they were actually used up.  \ 
Excessive  deductions  tend to reduce both reported profits 
and the corporate  tax burden. 
Most analysts would agree that depreciation  rates are 
now currently  completely  divorced  from actual capital 
consumption.  By 1981 for example, automobiles  could be 
entirely  depreciated  in only three years, with much of that 
occuring  in the first year.  Railroad  tank cars are 
depreciated  in ten years and nothing  is expected  to last 
more than fifteen.6  To trace the history  of this process, 
the average depreciation  rate is graphed  in Figure  5 which 
shows the annual depreciation  deduction  per dollar  of 
depreciable  assets.  This rate rose steadily  from 5.2% in 
1960 to over 9% by 1986.  In other words,  during this period 
the average  lifetime of capital  for tax purposes  decreased 
from 19 to almost  11 years. 
[See Figure 5 in the Appendix] 
6 See lVCorporation  Income Tax Return",  IRS  (1981, p. 5). Net Interest 
Another  source of understatement  in reported profits  is 
the fact that net interest payments  are not treated  as a 
component  of corporate profits  in the same way as dividends. 
Corporations  can choose to raise capital through  equity  or 
debt but in either case it is incumbent upon them to 
generate  sufficient  profits to cover the cost in the form of 
interest payments  or dividends  and capital gains.  Dividends 
have the advantage  of flexibility  since they are paid at the 
discretion  of the company but interest payments  have a 
substantial  tax advantage  because the tax code defines  them 
as a cost rather than a component  of profits.7 
The tax advantage  of debt has apparently  been more 
attractive  to corporations  than the flexibility  of equity  as 
revealed by the steady increase  in the debt to equity  ratio 
since 1950.8  Indicative  of this fact is the growth  of 
interest payments  relative to dividends  since 1960 as 
presented  in Figure 6.  In fact, by 1970, net interest 
net 
payments were relatively  larger than dividends.  By treating 
net interest as a cost, profits  are significantly 
understated  which  of course reduces the corporate  tax.  Even 
more significant  for the macroeconomy  is that this tax break 
encourages  firms to increase their debt relative  to equity, 
thus reducing  their ability to weather periods  of slack 
demand. 
7 This reduces the overall tax burden by an amount equal to 
net interest multiplied  by the effective  tax rate. 
8 See Pechman,  (1977, p.361). 9 
[See Figure 6 in the Appendix] 
Adjusted  Profits 
It is possible  to adjust corporate  profits  in a way 
that corrects  for excessive depreciation  and the omission  of 
net interest.  The depreciation  adjustment  is made under the 
assumption  that the actual average depreciation  rate 
remained  at it's 1960 level, except  for a small annual 
increase due to the relative growth of the service  sector. 
Even the 1960 depreciation  rate may overstate  actual 
tVeconomicNt  depreciation  but at least each year will be 
comparable  as long as capital wasn't wearing  out any faster 
or slower during these three decades.  The correction  for 
net interest  is made by simply adding  it to reported 
profits.  Both of these adjustments  are described  in more 
detail  in the Appendix. 
The effects  of making  these adjustments  can be seen in 
Figure 7 which  shows the ratio of profits,  both reported  and 
adjusted,  to government  revenue.  Reported  profits 
(represented by o's) are consistently  lower than those 
corrected  for excessive  depreciation  and the omission  of net 
interest  (A's).  But reported profits  are also less 
representative  of actual business performance  than adjusted 
profits.  And since there  is no indication that adjusted 
profits  have significantly  declined  (ignoring the peaks  in 10 
1966 and 1979), the corporate  sector continues  to be a 
viable  source of potential  tax revenue. 
[See Figure 7 in the Appendix] 
The conventions  used by the IRS for calculating  taxable 
profits  are simply not very representative  of actual 
profitability  and in fact were not intended to be, at least 
since 1962.  Depreciation  deductions  were made more generous 
in order to cut the corporate  tax burden,  not to provide 
better estimates  of profits.  And for largely the same 
reason, net interest was excluded  from taxable  income.  The 
declining  corporate  profit rate, as generally  reported,  can 
largely be explained  as a consequence  of these deficiencies 
in the federal tax code. 
Section  III: Policy Alternatives 
With this simple model,  it is possible  to explore what 
would have happened  to corporate  tax shares  if different 
policies  had been  followed since 1960.  The results  of this 
recalculation  are contrasted  to the actual tax share 
(represented by o's) in Figure 8.  The first case 
(represented by +'s) examines the effect of holding  the 
effective  tax rate constant  at its 1960 level  (46%) and 
abolishing  all corporate  tax credits.  These policies  would 11 
have raised the corporate  tax share, especially  during the 
197os, but would not have prevented  an overall decline. 
The next line  (A's) shows the effect of these two 
policies  in combination  with the elimination  of excessive 
depreciation  rates.  And finally, the effect of all of these 
policies  in conjunction  with taxing net interest  is 
illustrated  by the last line  (x's).  This final figure shows 
that if all of these policies had been  followed,  corporate 
taxes would have fallen to only 20% of government 
expenditures  by 1986 as compared to the actual  figure of 7%. 
[See Figure 8 in the Appendix1 
The benefits  of these policies  are not limited to the 
additional  revenue that would be generated.  The foreign tax 
credit currently  creates a strong incentive  for U.S.  firms 
to invest abroad at the expense of U.S. jobs.  By 
eliminating  this credit,  some firms may be more  inclined to 
invest in the U.S., generating  more domestic  jobs and 
income.  Also, the current tax code creates  a bias  in favor 
of debt over equity by allowing a deduction  for net 
interest.  As a consequence,  many corporations  have 
increased the relative  size of their debt which  reduces 
their  financial  stability  especially  during recessions. 
Including  net interest  in the tax base would  eliminate  this 
bias. 12 
Obviously,  many  important details have to be addressed 
before these policies  can be implemented  through  corporate 
tax reform.  Some policies would have to be phased  in 
gradually  while  others could be implemented  rapidly.  The 
U.S. would  also find it advantageous  to coordinate  its tax 
policy with other countries  in order to avoid an 
international  bidding war to determine  corporate  national 
identities.  Another  consideration  is that the current\ 
period may be an inappropriate  time to raise taxes  if we are 
in fact near the peak of the business  cycle.  In order to 
avoid any sudden decrease  in aggregate  demand,  corporate  tax 
reform may have to be postponed  until the end of the next 
recession.  Unfortunately  this also means that  it's too late 
to eliminate  the debt bias which has already  impaired the 
resiliency  of the corporate  sector.  In summary,  each of 
these concerns  should be given serious consideration  but 
none of them present  insurmountable  obstacles  if the 
corporate  profit  tax is to be restored. 13 
Appendix:  Data and Analysis 
One of the objectives  of this paper  is to show that the 
percentage  of federal government  expenditures  financed by 
the corporate  profit tax declined  from 1960 to 1986. 
Therefore  the appropriate  variable  is the ratio of federal 
corporate  profit taxes to federal government  expenditures. 
Most of the data,  including corporate  income subject to tax 
(defined as profits,  (ll),  total  income tax after credits 
CT) t  total tax credits  (C), foreign tax credit  (Cf), 
depreciable  assets  (A), and depreciation  deductions  (D), 
were obtained  from the annual publication  of the Internal 
Revenue  Service  entitled,  "Corporation  Income Tax Returns". 
Net interest payments  (In) for recent years were obtained 
from the Survey of Current Business and for later years, 
from The National  Income and Product Accounts  of the United 
States,  1929-1982:  Statistical  Tables.  Federal government 
expenditures  (G), nominal GNP, and dividends  (V) are taken 
from the Economic Report to the President. 
All of the values  in Figures  1 through  6 were derived 
from these sources and defined as follows; 
Figure  1: Corporate  Tax Share = T/G 
Figure 2: Effective  Tax Rate =  (T+C)/II 
Figure  3: Ratio of Credits to Gov. Expenditures  = C/G 
Figure 4: Ratio of Profits to Gov. Expenditures  = II/G 
Figure 5: Average  Depreciation  Rate = D/A 
Figure 6: Ratio of Net Interest to Dividends  = In/V 14 
An adjusted profit  rate is discussed  in section  II 
which eliminates  excessive  depreciation  caused by arbitrary 
changes  in the tax code.  One way to do this is to replace 
the annual reported depreciation  deduction  by an adjusted 
value equal to 5.18% of depreciable  assets  (its 1960 level). 
This correction  would maintain  a constant  average 
depreciation  rate, thus eliminating  any increase due to tax 
reform.  But it would  also eliminate  any legitimate  inorease 
caused by the structural  shift in the economy  from goods 
producing  industries to services. 
In 1960, for example,  average depreciation  rates  in 
wholesale  and retail trade  (8.5%) and services  (10.2%) were 
distinctly  higher than in transportation  (3.4%) and 
manufacturing  (5.8%).  An increase in the relative  size of 
the first two sectors would cause the average  rate for the 
economy to rise.  Separate  estimates  of structural  change 
show that it accounts  for  . 25 of the total 4.04 percentage 
point  increase during this period.9  Therefore  it is assumed 
that the actual depreciation  rate increased  linearly  from 
5.18% in 1960 to 5.43% in 1986 which allows  for a small 
increase  (.25) due to structural  change.  These new 
9 Specifically,  the change due to structural  factors  is 
equal to C diASi which  is summed over seven major  sectors 
(i.e. mining,  construction...).  In this expression  di 
equals the average depreciation  rate between  1960 and 1986 
and ASi is the change  in asset shares for each i industry. 
The reason structural  change  is not particularly  important 
is because  services  and wholesale  and retail trade continue 
to account  for a relatively  small fraction of the economy's 
total assets. 15 
depreciation  rates were then used to correct profits  for 
excessive  depreciation. 
The final adjustment  is made by adding net interest to 
profits  that have already been corrected  for excessive 
depreciation.  A decision was made to use net interest 
rather than gross  interest, and to restrict the interest 
data to nonfinancial  corporate businesses.  The purpose  of 
including  interest  is to treat capital raised by debt  in an 
analogous manner  as capital raised by equity and since 
corporations  are both lenders and borrowers,  net interest  is 
more likely to represent their actual dependence  on debt. 
While nonfinancial  corporations  utilize debt to produce 
goods or provide  services,  financial corporations  use debt 
to finance lending.  Therefore,  debt in financial 
corporations  is not a true alternative  for equity and is 
excluded  from the profit adjustment. 
Inflation 
Inflation  can affect profits  in several different  ways. 
Since capital goods are depreciated  according  to their 
historical  costs, capital consumption  allowances  understate 
actual costs during periods  of inflation, causing profits  to 
be overstated.  Furthermore,  inflation has a similar  effect 
on inventories  under the FIFO method  (first-in-last-out) 
which  simply undervalues  materials  consumed  out of 
inventories  during  inflation.  In this situation,  most  firms 
find it advantageous  to utilize  LIFO  (last-in-first-out) 16 
which values  inventory  items at their higher  replacement 
cost.  By using LIFO, firms avoid overstating  their profits 
during  inflationary  periods which reduces their tax burden. 
But for firms which continue to use FIFO during  inflation, 
profits  can be overstated.10 
But even LIFO is not without  its faults.  LIFO does not 
allow for windfall  gains or losses that can result  from real 
changes  in the prices of inventory  items.  For example2  when 
crude oil prices  increased at a rate over and above the 
general  inflation rate, oil companies with  large inventories 
of crude oil experienced  a windfall  gain.  But under the 
LIFO method,  none of these gains showed up in reported 
profits.  It is not surprising  that many oil companies 
switched to LIFO during the 1970s in order to hide these 
windfall  gains and avoid additional profit taxes.11  In 
summary,  LIFO can cause profits to be understated  when  real 
input prices  increase and overstated when they decrease. 
Inflation  can also create gains that are not included 
in reported profits.  This pertains  to corporations  that are 
net borrowers  because  inflation automatically  reduces the 
size of their liabilities,  creating windfall  gains.  This 
benefit  from inflation, as well as the penalties  for 
depreciation  and FIFO inventories,  affect the true 
10 Ken Petrick  from the Bureau of Economic Analysis  at the 
Department  of Commerce  suggested that some companies  did not 
switch to LIFO because they were concerned  about reporting 
lower profits.  It may be that low profit  firms actually 
prefer to overstate  their profits during  inflation,  despite 
higher tax liabilities. 
11 See Ricks  (1982) 17 
profitability  of a business  but are not accounted  for in 
profits  reported  to the IRS.  Efforts by other researchers 
to make these adjustments  suggest that the errors which  tend 
to overstate  profits  are on average,  offset by those which 
understate  them.12  Therefore,  lacking any better  estimates 
of these effects,  no attempt was made to correct profits  for 
inflation. 
Policy Alternatives 
The estimated  tax shares reported  in Figure 8 for 
various  policy  alternatives  were generated  from the basic 
model, 
T/G =  (n/G) t -  (C/G) 
In the first alternative,  the historical  tax rate  (t) is 
replaced with  its value  in 1960  (46%) and all tax credits 
are converted  to deductions.  This new tax share is equal to 
.46(II-C)/G. In the next alternative,  the first two changes 
are retained,  but historical  profits are replaced with 
profits  adjusted  for excessive depreciation.  And  in the 
final case, profits  are adjusted  for both excessive 
depreciation  and net interest  (ll'). This  final tax share 
represents  the cumulative  effect of all the policies,  and is 
given by,  .46(ll'  + In - C)/G. 
12 See Pechman  (1977, p 167). 18 
National  Income Product Accounts 
The Department  of Commerce  calculates  an alternative 
profit measure  for the national  income product  accounts 
(NIPA) which  is reported  in the Survey of Current  Business 
and the Economic Report to the President.  It is interesting 
to compare adjusted  IRS profits  in this study to the NIPA 
measure which  is widely used as an indicator of corporate 
profitability.  First, excessive depreciation  charges  are 
eliminated  in NIPA which employs more consistent  service 
lives and straight-line  depreciation.  This correction 
increased  corporate  profits by $127 billion  in 1986 and $134 
billion  in 1985.  Although  the NIPA correction  is done at a 
very disaggregated  level, the result is similar to the 
aggregate  correction  made  in this paper which  increased 
profits by $128 billion  in 1986 and $131 billion  in 1985. 
In other respects there are significant  differences 
between NIPA and adjusted  IRS profits.  Net interest 
payments  are not included  in NIPA which  is a major  source of 
understatement.  Furthermore,  NIPA profits  are adjusted  for 
inflationary  effects on inventories  and depreciation  but not 
liabilities.  This one-sided  correction  reduces profits 
during  inflationary  times because  it eliminates  the biases 
that tend to overstate  profits without  addressing  the biases 
acting  in the opposite direction.  This ensures that NIPA 
profits will  fall below actual profits.  In contrast,  the 
adjusted  IRS profits  in this paper are not corrected  for 
inflation under the assumption  that the negative  effects  are 19 
approximately  offset by the positive  ones.  In addition, 
NIPA uses the LIFO method to correct  inventories  for 
inflation, which as stated earlier, misrepresents  the effect 
of real price changes  for inputs. 
Two additional  sources of understatement  can be found 
in both series.  Neither profit measure  corrects  for the 
excessive  deductions  taken  for assets  financed through  the 
investment  tax credit.  This source of profit understatement 
should have grown since 1964 as the percentage  of assets 
financed by the government  increased.  In addition,  higher 
interest rates, caused by inflation or government  policies, 
tend to depress bond prices which can reduce the value  of 
debt for those corporations  that are net borrowers.  This 
windfall  gain is not reflected  in reported profits  but could 
have been significant  following the sharp increase  in 
interest rates after 1979. 
In Figure  9, NIPA profits without  net interest  (o's) 
and adjusted  to include net interest  (A's) are compared  to 
the adjusted  IRS statistics  calculated  in this paper  (+'s). 
Each of these series corresponds  to after-tax  profits 
(federal, state, local, and foreign taxes) as a percentage 
of GNP.  As can be seen in this graph, the downward  trend  in 
NIPA profits  is essentially  eliminated when net interest  is 
included.  It is also evident that adjusted NIPA profit 
rates  (including net interest) are lower than the IRS 
adjusted  rates after  1970, largely because  of the one-sided 
adjustments  for inflation.  If, as assumed  in this paper, 20 
the  overall  effect  of  inflation  on  corporations  is  neutral, 
then  the  adjusted  IRS  rates  should  be  more  representative  of 
corporate  profitability. 21 
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Figure 3 
Corporate  Tax  Credits: 
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Average  Depreciation  Rate: 
Depreciation  Deductions  divided 
by  Depreciable  Assets 
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Figure  6 
Ratio  of  Net  Interest  to  Dividends 
for  U.S.  Corporations 
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Various  Policy  Alternatives 







I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  I 
1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
Year 
*  Reported  Profits  --I-  No  Credits  8~ ts.46 
-J+-  Const  Ave  Dep.  -  Tax  Net  Interest 
Sourcm:  IRS  and  ERP,  Calculations 




After  Tax  Profit  Rates 
After  Tax  Corporate  Profits/GNP 
Profit  Rate 
0.02l”“I  ““I  ““I”“I  ““I  ” 
1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
Year 
*NIPA  +  Net  Interest  -  NIPA  -I-  Adjusted  IRS 